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Introduction
Religious extremism is one of the leitmotifs of our time. Issues of fundamentalism, religiously inspired violence, radicalisation and reactionary theology shape political events and create prominent media headlines in all parts of the world. In Britain, the debate around religious extremism has centred overwhelmingly on issues relating to Islam, with concerns about other faiths having been relegated to the margins. In particular, the subject of extremism within Britain's single largest faith -Christianity -has been notably underexplored. On the face of it this lack of attention might seem to be well deserved.
Conservative Christian (often defined as 'fundamentalist') cause groups are relatively few in number and are typically considered to exert little practical influence, both in a cultural as well as a political sense. Yet further exploration of this topic is not entirely without merit.
Indeed, in recent years conservative Christian groups have been involved in a variety of controversial issues and public policy debates, including high profile disputes around free speech, abortion, assisted dying, same-sex marriage, the regulation of medical technologies, religious freedom and equalities legislation, that make studying their political activities a meaningful and worthwhile endeavour.
An interesting question in this respect concerns the existence of a British 'Christian Right' comparable to the social movement that rose to prominence in the United States during the late 1970s. Commentators who assert the reality of such a grouping point to the political activism of conservative Christian groups as evidence of a mobilised fundamentalist force.
Conversely, those critical of such claims point to a lack of actual political influence and comparison to the core features of the U.S Christian Right. One issue here is the absence of a block conservative Christian vote linked to a single political party. While the U.S Christian Right has strong links to the Republicans, Christian voting and affiliation in Britain (even for its more conservative forms) is very much a divided, cross-party affair. 12 A second issue concerns the limited social and political influence of conservative Christians in Britain. Being numerically smaller and financially weaker than their U.S counterparts, conservative
Christians have thus far struggled to make any obvious headway in key political areas. In recent years a series of high-profile campaigns involving opposition to abortion, scientific research using human embryonic stem cells and the legalisation of same-sex marriage, have been lost. Differences in political complexion are important here as well. Conservative
Christians in Britain tend to engage with a different set of issues, and (for the most part) have more left-of-centre economic views than their counterparts in the U.S Christian Right.
Besides a number of overlapping themes (centring, most notably, on issues such as the ethics of sexual reproduction and religious freedom), the concerns of the U.S. movement, with its support for military interventions, strong pro-Israel stance, its advocacy of creationism and its dislike of Big Government, are said to diverge substantially from those of conservative Christian groups in Britain. 13 Further differences are highlighted in the respective opportunity structures available to British and U.S. Christian groups. While the federal and de-centred structures of the U.S. political system provide numerous points of access for Christian groups seeking to shape and influence political life, the unitary, centralised and tightly controlled political system in Britain is said to provide far fewer opportunities for groups seeking to advance a political agenda. 14 Given these differences, the general view here, as Paul Bickley puts it, is that:
the oft-repeated claim that there is a coherent and organised network driven by a growing conservative religious base, machinating behind the scenes, waiting to lay hold of the levers of power in a way that is corrosive of public debate or the broader political culture, is either fearful misunderstanding, a deliberate misrepresentation or a mix of the two. 15 The crux of this debate, and hence the question of whether or not a British 'Christian Right'
can be said to exist, however, is to a large extent a definitional one. Those rejecting the idea (and, by extension, the existence of a politically influential conservative Christian movement)
typically do so by highlighting the lack of practical political impact exerted by conservative Christian groups, and by comparing them directly to the characteristics and features of the U.S movement, against which they are duly said to fall short. Those arguing that a British
Christian Right does exist, on the other hand, claim that rejecting its existence purely on the basis of a U.S comparison is a tautological form of reasoning that obscures the fact that politically influential (at least potentially) conservative Christian groups are a reality. with, an array of wider factors around the political dynamics of group mobilisation. These themes are usefully highlighted with the conceptual framework of Social Identity Theory.
Deriving from the disciplines of psychology and sociology, this attempts to provide a holistic account of cognitive and social processes, centring on the key role that identity issues play in group cohesion and collective political action. 16 While identity is considered to be an essential component of an individual's conception of self, it is also intricately embedded within a broader web of social and cultural relations. The particular components of an identity are also far from being static and fixed, but involve on-going and open-ended processes of reaffirmation and reconstruction. In this, the role of groups is thought to be particularly important. Although the precise motivations behind group membership vary, 17 groups provide key sites for the development and maintenance of identities; facilitating a sense of belonging and meaning as well as establishing norms for appropriate beliefs and behaviours. In this way, a collective basis for identity provides a focal point around which individual agents can coalesce, and can form a motivating factor for the promotion of shared interests based around common themes, issues and concerns. 18 A key feature of collective identity is a corporate desire on the part of groups to maintain a sense of internal cohesion and intergroup differentiation. This requires constant efforts to police for internal deviance that might threaten the solidarity and interests of the group, as well as to monitor the boundary between the group and the rest of society in order to ensure that a sense of distinctiveness is sustained. 19 Notions of collective identity also serve broader political objectives. The way in which the values, needs and interests of a group are framed plays a crucial role in helping to position the group in respect of wider society and in legitimising its activities, viewpoints and claims (while simultaneously trying to delegitimise and negate those of its opponents). 20 These dynamics of group mobilisation are typically sharpened in situations involving uncertainty and/or where a threat to the group and its interests is thought to exist. 21 In this context the value of Social Identity Theory is that it highlights two salient points. The first of these is that the use of identity markers is an essential part of collective action framing: being necessary to energise and unify the membership of a group, but also forming a means of strategically positioning it in order to help facilitate the achievement of wider political ambitions. The second point is that these considerations mean that the adoption or rejection of an identity marker (such as 'Christian Right') will be shaped by a number of factors, including the main social, political and cultural issues that are thought to be affecting the group, the character of the relationships that exist within the group as well as between the group and wider society, and the specific nature and composition of the group itself, including its primary goals and objectives.
The composition of the 'Christian Right'
This paper explores these issues by examining the collective action frames deployed by the main groups that are typically said to belong to a British 'Christian Right'. Although there is no consensus on which groups might be involved in such a bloc, a number of core organisations attract consistent and repeated attention within the literature and commentary on the topic. These groups, primarily, include: the Christian Institute, the Evangelical Alliance, Anglican Mainstream, Christian Concern, Christian Voice, Christian Action
Research and Education (CARE), the Conservative Christian Fellowship, the Christian Medical Fellowship, Core Issues Trust and the Christian Legal Centre. 22 The bulk of the empirical research for this study was based on a series of eight semistructured interviews with elite-level representatives drawn from these organisations.
Requests for an interview were directed either to the head of the organisation itself or, where The relatively small number of interviewees involved in the core study means that care needs to be taken when generalising from its findings. The composition of the main sample was also predominantly male and white, and was largely (but not exclusively) London-centric.
This may also limit the wider applicability of the views and opinions expressed. people. 27 The largest survey of evangelical opinion in Britain (conducted by the Evangelical Alliance and involving a poll of over 15,000 self-identifying evangelicals) found strong support for conservative views (with almost two-fifths of respondents professing a belief in hell and around a fifth maintaining that Christianity and evolution were incompatible), 28 but the proportion of evangelicals likely to sympathise with the political activities of a Christian
Right remains unknown. Research also shows that while most fundamentalists tend to be evangelicals, the opposite relationship is not true, 29 and the negative connotations associated with the term 'fundamentalist' (along with the fact that survey respondents are unlikely to self identify themselves in this way) makes gaining more detailed information a highly difficult task. Following the tenets of Social Identity Theory, the activities of conservative Christian organisations are primarily directed towards two separate kinds of audiences: internal and external. The former of these (what might be termed 'inward-facing') activities, are tailored towards members of the group or like-minded constituencies, and are designed to address issues and concerns that are particular to the group itself or to its own sectional area of expertise (such as providing legal support or advice). In this respect, a key role of conservative Christian groups is to help reinforce a sense of identity and belonging.
According to one interviewee, for instance, a central goal of their organisation is to show 'ordinary Christian people' that someone is out there making their case, and to reassure them that they are not 'swivel-eyed loons'. 32 Another notes that the direction of their organisation is 'not so much campaigns, it's more drawing things to people's attention', and that its efforts are 'not so much aimed at the general public, but just to raise up a standard so that people who are listening who agree with me say "oh yeah, hang on a minute, somebody there's saying what I believe"'. The general aim is 'to provide a testimony … a little flag that people can rally around'. 33 Running parallel to this, the external (or 'outward-facing') activities of conservative Christian groups are aimed principally at shaping opinions at the level of British society and culture with a view to promoting a greater role for Christianity and influencing public policy issues.
These goals are clearly expressed in the public mission statements of conservative Christian groups themselves. The declared aim of Christian Concern, for example, is 'to work to infuse a biblical worldview into every aspect of society ... to be a strong Christian voice in the public sphere', and to 'change public opinion on issues of key importance and affect policy at the highest levels'. In like fashion, the aim of the Christian Institute is 'the furtherance and promotion of the Christian religion in the United Kingdom', with the overall objective being for the British state 'to adopt Christian values and to implement godly laws'. 34 Interviewees maintain that these objectives do not reflect a desire to impose religious values on the rest of society, but are simply about ensuring equal participation in British public life.
As one respondent puts it, politics is 'a dirty old business but it's an important business, it's about running the country, why wouldn't you want men and women of faith and values being involved in it to bring their principles and their integrity, their faith and so on, into that square?' 35 Another explains that the general aim is not 'to create some kind of theocracy that overrules the rights and views of people who differ fundamentally from ourselves', but simply to find a way 'that allows society to enable different points of view to function'. but to do so in a way that maintains a sense of internal cohesion and unity amongst group members. Here, the main response in terms of collective action framing has been the construction of a narrative built upon two primary assertions. The first is that secularisation poses a serious threat to the social and moral probity of the nation. The second is that it represents a danger to religious rights and freedoms. 46 A key theme here is that the decline of Christianity has led to a loss of social cohesion, the rise of a crude individualist, consumerist culture and a sense of moral relativism, all of which are considered to be at the root of many of Britain's social problems. the government has wanted is the benefit that the Christian organisations bring in particularwhich is loads of good social work on the ground -but you try and put Jesus in or prayer in, the thing that actually changes lives', and the real attitude was 'don't give out the bibles, don't talk about Jesus'. 58 One interviewee puts the point more forcefully still, claiming that the legalisation of same-sex marriage was 'completely bonkers … even demonic', 59 and another accuses the government of having 'abused religious people'. As they complain, the government's approach is 'an attempt to, on the one hand, say that religions are important, and on the other hand to completely emasculate them in terms of any effectiveness in society'.
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The role of the church in the marginalisation of religion, on the other hand, is said to reside in its own wilful, decades long abandonment of the public square. One representative claims that their organisation 'would not need to exist if the church of England had spoken with a clear voice', and laments that many of the problems associated with secularisation have emerged as a result of 'the church failing to take her place, others vying loud in the public space'. 61 Supporting this view, another respondent notes that 'a number of other organisations' have been 'very active and very strong when it comes to lobbying … there is a tide that's turning, and unless the church stands up and speaks, we won't be entitled to hold that position in the public sphere'. 62 Highlighting the lack of engagement from Christians themselves, one interviewee expresses a desire to see 'Christ's church militant here on earth'
and for Christians to become more politically organised, 'getting out on to the streets and being active in the public sphere, getting elected, all these sorts of things'.
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Labels and framing
A key and related feature of this narrative is a wholesale rejection of the idea that a 'Christian Right' exists in Britain. Two key themes are particularly apposite here. One is the notion that efforts to create such a movement would be doomed to fail given Britain's social and political situation. As an example of this point, one interviewee claims that: 'I don't think there's any purchase for a heavy-handed Christian right over here at all', and notes that while there are 'some of the old-fashioned UKIP-y type people who might want to buy into that … I just don't see the need for it or desire for it'. 64 Another similarly maintains that the kind of extremists that might be constitutive of a Christian Right are usually no more than 'screaming mullahs … somebody with a laptop in a bedroom with an attitude'. While developments in the United States are said to be 'really influential in terms of how it informs the Evangelical church in the UK', the idea of importing some form of U.S-style 'culture wars' is regarded as wholly inappropriate. Despite noting that 'there are some here in the UK church who'd like to see the same thing', the idea of attempting to gain political advantage by fostering a split between the values of the religious and the non-religious is one that simply 'doesn't work'. Another interviewee makes an equally robust assertion. As they put it, the language of fundamentalism is nothing more than 'a strategy that is being used to undermine a particular point of view'. Thus:
It does my head in, because I think just because an individual believes in the fundamentals of the Christian gospel doesn't make them a fundamentalist … just because I have sincerely held Christian views, literally believing in the resurrection, in the atonement of sin, and just because I happen to believe that homosexuality in a sinful practice, you know, I'm labelled as a fundamentalist.
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Making the exact same point, another respondent maintains that their organisation is 'more Methodist socialism than any kind of … right wingerry', and claims that the term 'fundamentalist' is simply used as a term of abuse, amounting to little more than 'a kind of name-calling', the throwing of 'insults' and 'an ad hominem attack'. As they put it:
'Everybody believes something fundamentally, I just happen to believe that God exists and he became man in the Lord Jesus Christ, walked this earth, died, was buried and rose again and is seated in heaven and will come again in glory, you know, I believe the creed … it's just ordinary Christianity'. often opposed on 'slippery slope' grounds involving the social consequences of unregulated scientific technology, the case against assisted dying has been similarly based around the implications for the most vulnerable groups in society, while opposition to the legalisation of same-sex marriage was based primarily around claims of historical tradition, the lack of an electoral mandate, and the social problems that (it was said) would invariably result. 70 Framing core arguments in this way reflects a recognition (if tacitly) of the fact that, in an increasingly secularised society, religious groups can best hope to influence wider opinion by avoiding narrative claims that are couched in theological terms and by framing them within a secular language of minority rights and freedoms. 71 These strategic requirements are well recognised by representatives of conservative Christian groups themselves. Explaining the reasoning behind the use of secular rather than religious arguments by their own organisation, for instance, one representative notes that:
It's not because they don't have these convictions … it's because we live in a postChristian society, so if I use Christian arguments most people are not going to be persuaded by them … you've got to use the language that people connect with … if I'm talking to a Christian audience, then I'll couch it in different ways. 72 On the same theme, another respondent states that the choice of 'when to use explicit religious arguments and language in public life' is 'a big issue' for their organisation, and maintains that while it remains impossible to 'separate the theology out from public discourse', the danger of giving a green light to the use of theological arguments was that they 'could end up with all sorts of stuff' that could be politically disadvantageous. Thus, as they explain:
There's a time and a place for it … 99% of your Christian discourse is going to be implicit rather than explicit in that context, so you've got to be sensible about this, I
think, because it plays into the hands of the secularists who just want to paint us as some sort of gung-ho.
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A related theme here is that the use of secular arguments does not contradict theologically- Another interviewee sets out the same line of argument. As they put it: 'the kind of apologetics that I would offer around the position we take is not couched in a religious argument … in my view there is enough in science that would support the view that we take'.
The use of an overtly secular language, then, is because 'most religious groups realise that they have a particular take on reality which is not shared across the board', but also that the findings of science and religion on issues such as the dangers of homosexuality and abortion are such that 'in terms of the scientific data … there's no need to appeal to the religious argument'. 76 Another representative argues that a successful defence of heterosexual marriage can be made on secular grounds because 'science shows and studies show that children do best when raised by a mother and a father'. As they put it: 'I think a lot of secular interfacing arguments were made because they can be made', and that 'I believe them from a faith perspective, from believing in the bible, but science and sociology and life backs it up, it always does … that's the truth'. This approach, however, is far from problem free. Framing core arguments in secular terms may well be necessary for appealing to a wider audience but the evidence to date suggests that their influence has been mixed. Notwithstanding some limited measures of success, such as helping to shape a popular news agenda around themes of religious discrimination (with close links between certain conservative Christian groups and sections of the right-wing media), such gains need to be weighed against other, and potentially more substantial, reversals such as the failures on abortion, medical science and same-sex marriage as well as the repeated loss of legal challenges brought on issues of employment discrimination.
The use of a secularised discourse for collective action framing is also something of a doubleedged sword. For one, assertions of marginalisation and claims that religious groups need to be accorded the same formal rights and equalities as other social interests themselves go to highlight the sectional character of religious groups, thereby undermining claims about the need for special treatment in the form of political and legal privileges in defence of religious freedoms. This is especially pressing when these privileges can be seen as traducing the rights of other minorities. Another, and potentially more serious, problem, however, is that the adoption of a secular discourse effectively reduces the amount of control that religious groups have over the direction of their own narrative claims and structures. In contrast to the use of theological arguments, about which religious groups can claim to have particular expertise, attempting to legitimise public policy arguments with recourse to secular norms supported by scientific research can expose groups to unexpected shifts in the evidence base that can challenge and undermine the core assertions that are being made. If same-sex marriage does not lead to growing social problems, for instance, or if the legalisation of assisted dying does not lead to a greater number of deaths amongst vulnerable groups in the way that conservative Christian groups contend, then the credibility of the arguments being used is likely to be eroded. Moreover, the internalisation of secular norms and a commitment to evidence-based argument could compel religious organisations to move in directions they may not wish to go (being forced to accept same-sex marriage once expected problems fail to materialise, for instance), creating the risk of internal splits and fissures within their own memberships. With 'Christian Right' groups set to remain a feature Britain's religio-political landscape for the foreseeable future, research such as this is essential if we are to expand our understanding of their processes and dynamics.
